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IV

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 20160671-SC

V.

MIGUEL HERNANDEZ,
Respondent-Appellant.

AMICUS BRIEF OF THE UTAH ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court erred in ruling that the defense was not entitled to
<i

subpoena as a witness the individual that is alleged to be the victim of the crime
charged against the defendant. In doing so, that court violated the constitutional,
statutory, and rules-based rights of defendant/appellant Miguel Hernandez
("Hernandez"). First, this case does not implicate the right of confrontation.
Instead, it is controlled by the right to compulsory process, a related but separate
right the defendant has. Compulsory process, that is, the defendant's right to
command the attendance and testimony of witnesses, is a right so fundamental that

•
is guaranteed in the Utah Constitution, as well as in statutes and court rules of our
state.
Nothing in the law, not even the Victims' Rights Amendment to the Utah
Constitution, operates to confine this right to the ultimate trial, but multiple
provisions strongly indicate that it extends to preliminary hearings, as well. If the
testimony to be taken from the subpoenaed witness is germane to the subject
matter of the preliminary hearing, the subpoena seeking that testimony should be
enforced. Moreover, nothing in the Victims' Rights Amendment or in the Rights
of Crime Victims Act operates to immunize crime victims from being called as
witnesses by the defense.
ARGUMENT

I.

The Law Governing Confrontation of Witnesses Is Irrelevant to the
Issue of Whether the Defense Has the Right to Compel the Attendance
of Witnesses at a Preliminary Hearing
Before the district court, the State supported its motion to quash the

subpoena issued by counsel for Hernandez by focusing, in part, on the right of
confrontation at a preliminary hearing. The right of confrontation is the right of
the defense ( 1) to require the state to produce before the court the witness that is
providing the testimony in question and (2) to question that witness. Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-51 (2004). The State was partially correct, though
entirely irrelevant, in its argument below that there is no right of confrontation at a

2

•

preliminary hearing under either the federal or state constitution. State v.
@

Timmerman, 2013 UT 58; State v. Hattrich, 2013 UT App 177,130. The
admission of a witness's prior recorded statement at a preliminary hearing (as done
in both Timmerman and Hattrich) denies the defendant the opportunity to confront
the witness but, under the current state of the law, that does not itself violate that
defendant's constitutional rights if the witness's testimony is presented through

Gi

reliable hearsay that complies with the requirements of the applicable evidentiary
rules. Specifically, the introduction of prior recorded statements is allowed both
by the rules of procedure and evidence and the relevant constitutional provisions.
Utah R. Crim. P. 15.5; Utah R. Evid. 1102; Utah Const. art. I,§ 12. 1 In this case,

In 1994, the Victims Right Amendment was adopted as part of the Utah
Constitution. Utah Const., art. I,§ 12 ("1994 Amendment"). That amendment
added a provision that specifically limited the constitutional right to the
confrontation of witnesses against the defendant at the preliminary hearing by
allowing the use of reliable hearsay evidence. Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence was promulgated with the purposes of implementing this constitutional
amendment and it defines the circumstances that must be met before proposed
hearsay evidence may be admitted at a preliminary hearing. To the extent that the
hearsay evidence proffered by the prosecution is either not reliable or does not
comply with the requirements of Rule 1102, the right of confrontation still prevails
at the preliminary hearing. Additionally, to the extent that the prosecution presents
evidence through the testimony of a live witness, the defendant still has the right to
cross examine that witness at the preliminary hearing.
1

As more directly relevant to the issue now before the Court, the advisory
committee note to Rule 1102 states expressly: "Either party is at liberty to
subpoena and call any live witnesses whose testimony would be ge1mane to the
dete1mination of probable cause." In other words, the contraction of the right of
3

unlike in Timmerman and Hattrich, the defense is not arguing against the
introduction of the recorded interview or other out-of-court statement of the
alleged victim and therefore is not asserting a violation of the right to confront.
Instead, Hernandez has the right to compulsory process, a right that is
separately enshrined in both the federal and state constitutions and in statute and
court rule. The State below confused this right with the right of confrontation. In
neither Timmerman nor Hattrich did the defense issue subpoenas to any of the
witnesses or otherwise attempt to secure their presence. 2 In this case, the defense
issued a properly-drawn subpoena to the alleged victim of the crime. The State
argued, and the district court held, that Hernandez was not within his rights to do
so. As shown below, this is inconsistent with the rules-based, statutory, and
constitutional rights of the accused.

confrontation at preliminary hearings was based in part on the understanding that
the right of compulsory process would not be denied to the defendant.
In Hattrich, the defense, upon learning immediately prior to the preliminary
hearing that the State intended to present the written statement of a witness and not
call the witness to testify, moved the court to continue the hearing so that they
could issue a subpoena to and require the attendance of the witness, a motion the
court provisionally denied. Hattrich, 2013 UT App 177, il 27. The defense never
renewed the motion. Hattrich is distinguishable from the instant case in that there
the defense did not take available steps prior to (or even after) the scheduled
preliminary hearing to secure the witness's attendance and thereby waived the
compulsory process issue.
2

4
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II.

The Right of Compulsory Process Is Fundamental to a Defendant's
Right to a Preliminary Hearing
A.

The Right of Compulsory Process for a Preliminary Hearing Is
Rooted in the Utah Constitution

Both the state and federal constitutions include provisions guaranteeing the
defense the right "to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf." Utah Const. art. I, sec. 12; accord U.S. Const.
amend. VI (guaranteeing the right "to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor"). 3 The right to compulsory process is necessary to the
proper functioning of the adversary process. As the United States Supreme Court
reasoned:
We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice
. . . . The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is
both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice
would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or
speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial
system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure
of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To
ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts
that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence
needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (emphases added). In that case,
admittedly in a context different than the one now before this Court, the High
Court held that the right of compulsory process was so fundamental to the

e

The Sixth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1967).

3

5

processes of justice that it outweighed the President's invocation of executive
privilege. The value of a judgment based only on partial or speculative facts will

•

be "defeated." Even at the preliminary hearing stage, we should be loath to so
limit our judicial process.
Without compulsory process, one cannot be sure that the result reached in a
proceeding has any basis in reality. That it is a preliminary hearing rather than a
trial should not change the ultimate goal of the criminal process - finding the truth.
After all, the function of a preliminary hearing is to "ferret[] out groundless and
improvident prosecutions" and to prevent "the substantial degradation and expense
incident to a modem criminal trial when the charges against him are unwarranted
or the evidence insufficient." State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29,120 (quoting State v.

Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In doing so, the magistrate is empowered to make certain credibility
determinations. Id. 1123-24 (holding that magistrates may make credibility
determinations "limited to determining that evidence is wholly lacking and
incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue" (internal quotation marks
omitted)). A magistrate cannot be expected to carry out this task in a vacuum. But
that is exactly what the magistrate will be required to do if subpoena power is not
available to the defendant for use at the preliminary hearing.

6

•

•

eJll

Indeed, without the availability of compulsory process, a proceeding cannot
truly be said to be adversarial in nature. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
818 (1975) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)). Since the preliminary hearing in Utah is an adversarial proceeding,4
the right of compulsory process is necessary. Without it, the preliminary hearing
would be reduced virtually to the point of being a one-side determination of
probable cause, an ex parte proceeding, with the defendant and his counsel merely
looking on as passive observers. See State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah
1981) (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980)). Since the
advent of the "1102 statement,"5 Utah R. Evid. 1102, and the "CJC interview,"6
Utah R. Crim. P. 15.5, that is precisely what may and likely will happen if the right
of the defendant to compel the attendance of witnesses is denied.

See, e.g., State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ,I 31; State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ,r 16 n.3;
State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435,438 (Utah 1998); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 540
(Utah 1981); State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783, 785 (Utah 1980).

4

An "1102 statement" is a statement signed under oath and subject to the penalty
of perjury or certain other out-of-court statements that are deemed to be reliable
and therefore admissible at a preliminary hearing even if the declarant is not
present before the court. Utah R. Evid. 1102.
5

A "CJC interview" is an interview of an alleged child victim of physical or sexual
abuse conducted and recorded at the "Children's Justice Center" in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 15.5 if the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. If those
requirements are met, that recorded interview may be introduced into evidence at
the preliminary hearing, even if the child victim is not called by the State as a
witness at the hearing.
6

®)
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7

In the Brooks case, at trial the defendant objected to the admission into
evidence of the preliminary hearing testimony of the victims of the alleged crime,
who were not present at the trial, without first determining whether that testimony
was reliable. The court held that the preliminary hearing itself provided the needed
indicia of reliability to allow the recorded testimony of the absent victims to be
admissible. Specifically, the court held that two specific aspects of the preliminary
hearing help assure reliability, namely, the defendant's right of cross examination
and his right to subpoena and present witnesses. Brooks, 638 P.2d at 540 (quoting

Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783). The application of these "basic procedural
safeguards" is needed to allow the preliminary hearing to retain its basic purpose of
terminating improvident prosecutions at or near the inception. Since the
requirement for the first of these two factors has now been limited, 7 the importance
of the second, the defendant's right to compel the attendance of witnesses, has
grown even more in importance.
To ensure that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing is in fact
reliable, the defendant should be free to call witnesses that will show that the
"reliable hearsay evidence" cannot be true. For instance, "reliable hearsay" may be
admitted at the preliminary hearing accusing the defense of committing the alleged

See the discussion of the 1994 Amendment in footnote 1, supra, and in Section
IV, below.

7

8

•

crime at a particular time and location. To test the reliability of that evidence, the
defense should be allowed to call witnesses and subpoena documents that would
show beyond question that the defendant was at another location at the specific
time of the alleged crime. 8 If the defense is not allowed to compel the attendance
of witnesses that have such evidence, the purpose of the preliminary hearing is
largely defeated. This applies whether the person to whom the subpoena is issued
is an unrelated third party or the alleged victim of the crime.

B.

Utah's Statutory and Rules-Based Law Also Guarantees a
Defendant at a Preliminary Hearing the Right of Compulsory
Process

The importance of the right of compulsory process as explained above is
recognized by our state's statutes and rules, as well. First, "[i]n criminal
Ii>

prosecutions the defendant is entitled ... (e) [t]o have compulsory process to
insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf." Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1).
This right is one of several rights guaranteed by this section of the Utah Code.
Among the others are the right to appear and defend in person or by counsel, to
receive a copy of the charges, to testify in one's own behalf, to be confronted by
Of course, there might be times when such evidence merely raises a question of
fact that a factfinder should resolve after a full trial. In other instances, however,
the evidence subpoenaed by the defense and introduced at the preliminary hearing
may be so compelling as to justify the magistrate in determining that the
allegations in the "reliable hearsay evidence" are so lacking in credibility that it
cannot be considered on the question of probable cause. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ,r,r
23-24.
8

9

•
the witnesses against one, and the right of appeal. Utah Code. Ann.§ 77-1-6(1).
Nothing in this section limits these rights to the time of trial. 9
Additionally, Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically
provides the defendant the right of compulsory process in the case of a preliminary
hearing.
Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be
held under the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried
before a court. The state has the burden of proof and shall proceed
first with its case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant
may testify under oath, call witnesses, and present evidence. The
defendant may also cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(l) (emphases added). The meaning of this rule is clear.
First, the preliminary hearing is to be conducted under the same rules as govern a
bench trial. It is beyond argument that a defendant has the right at trial to
subpoena witnesses and to use them to present evidence as he may choose, subject
to reasonable limitations based on, for instance, relevance, harassment, and

The two rights in this section that are or may be limited, in whole or in part, to the
time of trial are (1) the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury (rights
that by definition are intrinsically inte1iwined with the trial itself, as opposed to
other hearings) and (2) the right of confrontation. At the time this statute was last
amended, in 1980, the right of confrontation also applied fully to preliminary
hearings. It is only because of the subsequent adoption of the 1994 Amendment
that the right of confrontation has a more limited application at preliminary
hearings. See footnote 1, supra. Accordingly, at the time this statute was enacted
or last amended, the legislature understood and intended that the right of
compulsory process would apply in contexts beyond the trial itself.

9

10

cumulativeness. Under the first sentence of Rule 7(i)(l), if a defendant may do so
at trial, he is likewise entitled to do so at the preliminary hearing.

If that were not clear enough, under the penultimate sentence of that
subparagraph, the accused has the right to call witnesses. This right is not limited
to those witnesses that are sufficiently friendly to the accused that they will appear
voluntarily. That interpretation would be at odds with all other provisions of law
and with the purpose of the preliminary hearing. To take advantage of this right, a
defendant must have the right to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses
that might not wish to appear for or at the call of the defendant.
The scope of a defendant's Rule 14(a)(2) subpoena power specifically
extends to witnesses for hearings, including victims of crimes. "A subpoena may
command the person to whom it is directed to appear and testify or to produce in
court or to allow inspection of records, papers or other objects, other than those
records pertaining to a victim covered by Subsection (b)." 10 Accordingly, only

10

The first subsection of Rule 14(b) provides:
No subpoena or court order compelling the production of medical,
mental health, school, or other non-public records pertaining to a
victim shall be issued by or at the request of the defendant unless the
comi finds after a hearing, upon notice as provided below, that the
defendant is entitled to production of the records sought under
applicable state and federal law.

11

subpoenas directed toward the production of records related to a victim are
excluded from the scope Rule 14(a)(2). The drafters of this rule clearly knew how
to draft an exception to the scope of the defendant's subpoena power because they
actually did draft such an exception. That exception, however, only extends to
certain records and did not reach individuals.
Although it is true that Rule 14(a)(2) gives the court the power to quash a
subpoena if it is unreasonable, the state must bear the burden of proving that a
particular subpoena is unreasonable. 11 In this case, the only argument advanced by
the State as to the supposed unreasonableness of Hernandez's subpoena is the fact
that it was directed toward an alleged victim. If that is all that is required to show
unreasonableness, the rule would have been drafted to exclude victims a,id
victim's records from its scope.
Instead, a court should determine a subpoena to be "unreasonable" only if it
determines that:

Utah R. Crim. P. 14(b)(l). The remaining subsections of Rule 14(b) provide
the procedures for a defendant to obtain the court order provided for by Rule
14(b)(l). They do not provide other exceptions to Rule 14(a).
The structure of this provision makes it clear that the burden of proof is on the
government. If the drafters had intended that the defendant bear the burden, they
would have drafted the rule more like the provisions of Rule 14(b), which restrict
the defendant's ability to gain access to records conce111ing a victim unless and
until the court first approves.
11

12

• The subpoenaed party has no relevant information to provide the court
concerning the matter;
• The subpoenaed witness's testimony is wholly cumulative;
• The sole purpose in issuing the subpoena is to threaten, intimidate,
harass, or badger the witness;
• The subpoena is procedurally improper (e.g., it does not comply with
the requirements of Rule 14(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure or Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12);
• The subpoena calls for the disclosure of privileged information; or
• Other improper purpose underlies the issuance of the subpoena. 13
Failure to limit the meaning of the term "unreasonable" to these circumstances, and
extending it to include any subpoena issued to a victim (or even to a child victim)

Rule 45 of the civil rules has been held to be applicable to criminal matters. See
State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, ,r,r 26-41 (holding that under Rule 45 a defendant
must give notice to the prosecution of the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum);
State v. Yount, 2008 UT App 102, ,, 11-16 (holding that under Rule 45 the state
must give notice to the defendant of the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
seeking production of the defendant's medical records); accord In re Criminal
Investigation, 738 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1987) (holding that the state must pay the costs
required by Rule 45 when issuing a subpoena as part of its criminal investigation).
12

Of course, that a subpoena may be unreasonable under one of these categories
would not preclude the enforcement of the subpoena if to deny enforcement would
violate the defendant's constitutional right to compulsory process. See Section
II.A., above.
13

13

witness would violate the plain meaning of Rule 14, especially when all of its
provisions are read together.
In the case now before the Court, the State has not shown that the
enforcement of the defendant's subpoena would in any way be unreasonable.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the subpoena is seeking the
disclosure of evidence that is not relevant or material to the proceedings. Indeed,
all indications are that the defense wishes to question the witness concerning the
very events that are alleged to be the basis for the charges now pending. Nor does
the defense seek evidence that is wholly cumulative. Similarly, the State has not
pointed to any procedural default in the subpoena and it is not aimed at obtaining
privileged information. Nor is there any basis in the record to believe that
Hernandez is seeking by the subpoena to threaten, intimidate, harass, or badger the
witness.

III.

That the Subpoenaed Witness's Testimony May or May Not Defeat
Bindover Does Not Control This Issue
A.

The Procedural and Evidentiary Rules Specifically Contemplate
the Subpoenaing of Witnesses by the Defense

As noted above, Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically
provides (I) that preliminary hearings shall be conducted under the same rules
applicable to trials, and (2) that the defense may call witnesses of its choosing as
part of presenting its defense. Of course, no one would read this to mean that the

14

Court must enforce subpoenas served on individuals that have no knowledge of
~

any facts related to the case to be heard. A defendant's subpoenas should,
however, be enforced as long as they are "germane" to the issues on which
probable cause will depend. See Utah R. Evid. 1102 advisory committee note
("Either party is at liberty to subpoena and call any live witnesses whose testimony
would be germane to the determination of probable cause."). The term "germane"

~

is not defined by Rule 1102 or by the advisory committee note but it does have a
well-recognized meaning: "2: being at once relevant and appropriate: FITTING."
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 489 (10 th ed. 1998); accord Black's Law
Dictionary 687 ( 6th ed. 1990) ("In close relationship, appropriate, relative,
pertinent. Relevant to or closely allied").
That an alleged victim's testimony about the event on which the crime
charged is based is "germane" under these definitions cannot be reasonably argued.
Any testimony that an alleged victim might give concerning the events comprising

~

the charged crime are necessarily germane. In addition to anything else that might
come of it, virtually any testimony given by an alleged victim will have a bearing
~

on that witness's credibility. Such testimony is material - is germane - to the case.
Such testimony is relevant to the crimes alleged. Such testimony is in close
relationship to the testimony to be provided under Rule 1102. Such testimony is
pertinent and appropriate.

15

Accordingly, nothing in Rules 7 or 14 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure precludes the enforcement of subpoenas issued by the defendant to an
unwilling witness as a general matter. Rather, every provision of those rules
requires the enforcement of such a subpoena if it is designed to produce germane
evidence, unless and until the state shows that the subpoena is "unreasonable."
The subpoena issued by the defense in this case was designed to elicit germane
evidence and was not in any way unreasonable.

B.

The Discovery Function of the Preliminary Hearing Requires the
Defense to Have the Right to Compel the Attendance of Witnesses

In addition, the preliminary hearing has traditionally served as a means for
the defense to obtain discovery.
Several ancillary purposes supplement the primary purpose of
the hearing. The examination provides a means of effectively
advising the defendant of the nature of the accusations against him.
The hearing also provides a discovery device in which the defendant
is not only informed of the nature of the State's case against him, but
is provided a means by which he can discover and preserve favorable
evidence.

The discovery available at the preliminary hearing represents
an important step in the preparation of the defendant's defense for the
subsequent trial. The opportunity to prepare an effective defense is
recognized as essential to the preservation of the defendant's
substantive right to a fair trial. Thus, here again, effectuation of the
ancillary purposes of the preliminary hearing mandates the application
of certain procedural safeguards to the hearing itself.
State v. Anderson, 612 P. 2d 778, 784 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added).

16

In the court below, the alleged victim argued that the discovery purpose had
been eliminated by the 1994 Amendment. This Court, however, has recognized
the ongoing right of the defendant to use the preliminary hearing as a means of
discovery. In State v. Talbot, 972 P. 2d 435 (Utah 1998), this Court reaffirmed that
ancillary purpose. After referring to the hearing's primary purpose of determining
probable cause, this Court stated, "Second, and independently, the preliminary
hearing acts as a discovery device advising the accused of the details of the charges
and preserving favorable evidence." Id. at 438 (citing Anderson, 612 P.2d at 784).
Accordingly, regardless of the arguments presented by the alleged victim, this
Court has already held that discovery remains a viable purpose underlying the
preliminary hearing.
Despite this ongoing purpose of the preliminary hearing, that purpose would
be virtually nullified if, after the restriction on the right to confrontation created by
the 1994 Amendment to article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, the Court
were to hold that there is no right to compulsory process either. Without the right
to require the state to require the appearance of witnesses that provide "reliable
hearsay," without the right to cross-examine such witnesses, and without the right
compel the attendance of such witnesses themselves or others, defendants are left
with nothing but what the state chooses to dole out grudgingly, sufficient only to
meet the prima facie standard of probable cause. That is not how an adversarial
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system is meant to work. And if that is how a preliminary hearing is required to
work, it is no longer adversarial.
Preliminary examinations in Utah are adversarial proceedings ....
Therefore, conflicting evidence may be expected. As is appropriate in
an adversarial proceeding, the accused is granted ... the right to
subpoena and present witnesses in his defense.

Talbot, 972 P .2d at 43 8 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; first
alteration in original).

IV.

Calling an Alleged Victim as a Witness at a Preliminary Hearing Does
Not Violate the Alleged Victim's Rights
As noted above, in 1994, Utah amended its constitution with the Utah

Victims' Rights Amendment, the 1994 Amendment. That amendment added a
new paragraph to section 12 of article I, which paragraph provides:
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at
any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Utah Const. A1i. I,§ 12. By its express terms, this amendment abrogated the right
of a defendant to confront the witnesses against him or her at a preliminary hearing
to the extent that reliable hearsay evidence that complies with the requirements of
Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence is introduced. This is because a prior
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•

recorded statement, which in the identified circumstances is expressly admissible,
cannot be cross examined. Instead, the amendment allows for the introduction of
"reliable hearsay" for the purpose of determining probable cause, a fact that
necessarily prevents confrontation through cross examination.
Nothing in this amendment, however, expressly addresses the right of
compulsory process. 14 Indeed, nothing in the amendment addresses the issuing of
subpoenas by either the prosecution or the defense. Given the constitutional rights
(as well as statutory and rules-based rights) that are at issue here, it should not be
presumed that it was the intent of the drafters of the amendment to nullify a
defendant's right to compulsory process.
Giving such an interpretation to the 1994 Amendment would severely·
undermine the fundamental purpose of the preliminary hearing, that is, the early

Indeed, as noted above, the advisory committee's note to this amendment's
implementing "legislation," i.e., Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
specifically disclaimed such intent. Utah R. Evid. 1102 advisory committee note
("Either party is at liberty to subpoena and call any live witnesses whose testimony
would be germane to the determination of probable cause."). The actions of those
implementing constitutional provisions are often considered as reasonable guides
to the intent underlying the constitutional provision. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) (considering the fact that the first Congress adopted the
death penalty for certain crimes in determining whether the death penalty violated
the Fifth Amendment, which was passed by that same Congress); Bors v. Preston,
111 U.S. 252, 256-57 (1884) (in construing the provisions of Article III of the
United States Constitution, the court analyzed the Judiciary Act of 1789, which
was adopted by the First Congress, many of whose members had been part of the
constitutional convention).
14
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terminating of unfounded prosecutions before they have the effect of substantially
injuring persons in their reputation, their property, and their liberty, when there is
no legitimate basis for such a prosecution. When a constitutional amendment
implicates a previously-existing constitutional right, unless the amendment is
absolutely clear that it intends to abrogate that right, the Court should strive to
harmonize the two constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Felix v. Milliken, 463 F.
Supp. 1360, 1384 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (construing Michigan's constitutional
prohibition on alcoholic beverages as not to prohibiting the sacramental use of
alcohol so as to be consistent with the First Amendment guarantee of the right of
free exercise of religion).

•

In summary·, the rights of victims, whether found in our state constitution or
in our statutes do not immunize such person from being subject to subpoena,
whether issued by the state or the defense.

•
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's order
quashing the subpoena.
DATED this 21st day of July, 2017.
UTAH ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS
ISi Stewart Golian
Stewart Gollan
Executive Director
Amicus Curiae

21

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that the foregoing AMICUS BRIEF OF THE UTAH
ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS complies with the typevolume limitations of Rule 24(f)(l) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, I
certify that, according to the word count of MS Word, the foregoing brief (including headings,
footnotes and quotations but excluding the cover page, table of contents, table of authorities,
certificates of service and compliance, and addenda) contains 5,165 words.

ISi Stewart Golian

Stewart Gollan
Executive Director, UACDL
Amicus Curiae

22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amicus
Brief of the Utah Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers to be mailed, firstclass, postage prepaid, this 21st day of July, 2017, to the following:
Sean Reyes
Utah Attorney General
Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee
Jeffrey R. Buhman
Christine G. Scott
Utah County Attorney's Office
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee
Joshua S. Baron
S. Yossoff Sharifi
Sharifi & Baron, PLLC
50 West Broadway, Suite 905
Salt Laake City, Utah 84101
NMadrid@SB-legal.net
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Miguel Hernandez

ISi Stewart Golian
Stewart Gollan

23

